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Case No. 980030-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) & -8(4) (1996 and Supp. 1998). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly construe the arranging statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1996 & Supp. 1998), when it accepted defendant's guilty 
plea based on his admission that he agreed to purchase $100 worth of marijuana 
from undercover police officers? 
2. Did the trial court properly accept defendant's guilty plea to the enhanced 
second degree felony offense of arranging in the absence of any factual basis for the 
penalty enhancement element? 
Although defendant timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea below claiming that 
he was innocent, he raised no challenge to the trial court's construction of the arranging 
statute, nor to the adequacy of the factual basis for the penalty enhancement element; 
therefore, these claims are waived. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 
1989) (requiring "some form of specific preservation of claims of error [below] before an 
appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1996 & Supp. 1998): 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally . . . distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substancef.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (1996 & Supp. 1998): 
. . . [A] person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to 
be unlawful under this section,... is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection 4(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
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(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with criminal solicitation of aggravated murder, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-203, 76-4-204, 76-5-202 (1995); 
conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-4-201, 76-4-202, 76-5-202 (1995 & Supp. 1998); and arranging to distribute 
marijuana, in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii),&8(4)(a) (1996 & Supp. 1998) (R. 1). Following plea negotiations, 
defendant pled guilty to the second degree felony drug offense, and the remaining first 
degree felony offenses were dismissed (R. 22; R. 71: 16-171), add. B. A copy of the 
Statement by Defendant Before Pleading Guilty (R. 18-11),2 is attached as Addendum A. 
Defendant timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he was innocent 
]The Change of Plea hearing was held on 31 October 1997 and a copy of the 
transcript is attached as Addendum B. The cover page of the change of plea hearing 
transcript is numbered "71." The subsequent pages retain their original numbering. 
Therefore, pages of that transcript will be numbered in this brief as MR. 71: [internal page 
number]." 
2The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
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(see R. 27 (pro se motion), R. 29 (motion filed by trial counsel)) (copies of both motions 
are contained in Addendum C). The trial court denied defendant's request and imposed 
an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years imprisonment (R. 31). The trial court then 
suspended imposition of the sentence and placed defendant on a 36 month probationary 
term (id ) . STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
On 2 October 1997, defendant met with undercover police officers in Utah County 
to, among other things, purchase marijuana (R. 2 (information), R. 71: 13), add. B. 
Defendant indicated that he would like to purchase $100 worth of marijuana from the 
undercover officers (id). At defendant's behest, the officers left to obtain the marijuana 
(R. 71: 13, 15), add. B. When the undercover officers returned with the marijuana, 
defendant declined to make the purchase, claiming that they had taken too long, and that 
he had purchased marijuana from another source (R. 71: 14-15), add. B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's legal challenge to the trial court's construction of the arranging statute 
is unpreserved. Moreover, defendant raises no rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, challenge to the validity of his unconditional guilty plea. Therefore, his claim 
of an inadequate factual basis for his guilty plea to arranging is not properly before the 
Court. To the extent defendant raises his challenge under a claim of ineffective assistance 
3The State recites only those facts pertinent to the drug offense to which defendant 
plead guilty. 
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of trial counsel, he fails to demonstrate that his undisputed agreement to purchase $100 of 
marijuana is legally insufficient to constitute arranging. He therefore fails to establish 
any deficient or prejudicial conduct on the part of trial counsel. 
Defendant does not similarly characterize his challenge to the factual basis for the 
drug-free zone penalty enhancement element as an ineffectiveness claim. Nonetheless, in 
adherence to the State's duty to promote justice, the State agrees that the record is legally 
insufficient to support the penalty enhancement element. Therefore, defendant's 
enhanced second degree felony conviction should be vacated and a third degree felony 
conviction for arranging to distribute marijuana should be entered in its place. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA 
In Point 1(C) of his brief, defendant asserts that the evidence adduced at the plea 
hearing is insufficient as a matter of law to support his guilty plea to the offense of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) & 8(4) (1996 & Supp. 1998). Aplt. Br. at 10-20. 
Defendant does not dispute that his conduct amounted to a drug offense, but rather, 
defendant claims his conduct did not constitute "arranging" for purposes of Section 58-
5 
37-8(1 )(a)(ii).4 Aplt. Br. at 14-16. Defendant's legal claim is raised for the first time on 
appeal and is therefore unpreserved. 
A. Waiver of Claimed Insufficient Factual Basis for Plea to 
Arranging 
At the time defendant entered his guilty plea defendant agreed that his conduct 
amounted to the offense of "arranging" (R. 71: 13-15), add. B. Specifically, defendant 
explained his conduct to the trial court as follows: 
DEFENDANT: They ask me to give them some money. I tell them no. 
I want to buy marijuana. They say forget about 
marijuana, this is important. I say forget it. They say I 
can get it for you. They went and bought it, and I say, 
"oh, you guys take forever." I hide my 100 dollar. 
Just because they say we get it, I say "no, I can't afford 






But at any rate, you did indicate to them, when they said they 
could get you some, you said go ahead and get it. 
Yeah, I said that. 
That's arranging to distribute; okay? 
Yes. 
(R. 71: 15), add. B. The trial court then accepted defendant's guilty plea (R. 71: 15-16), 
add. B. 
defendant's claim that there is an inadequate factual basis to support the drug-free 
zone penalty enhancement element of Section 58-37-8(4), is addressed in Point II, infra. 
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Defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, but claimed only that he was 
"innocent" because he had not actually purchased the marijuana (R. 25, 29), add. C. He 
did not assert that his admitted conduct failed as a matter of law to establish the offense of 
arranging for purposes of Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii); specifically, defendant made no 
assertion that the trial court had misinterpreted the arranging statute or any term therein. 
Id. Rather, defendant's motion suggests that his dissatisfaction with the plea stemmed 
from his concern about being deported (R. 29), add. C. The trial court summarily denied 
defendant's motion (R. 31). 
In light of the above, the trial court has had no opportunity to consider defendant's 
challenge to its construction of the arranging statute, and has therefore entered no relevant 
ruling thereon. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988) (refusing to consider 
claim where "record on appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has been given a 
fair opportunity to avoid an error"). Because defendant failed to specifically and 
particularly assert his statutory construction challenge below, the claim is waived. See 
State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 
1144-45 (Utah 1989) (both requiring requiring "specific preservation of claims of error 
[below] before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). 
B. Sufficient Factual Basis for Plea to Arranging 
Even assuming that defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was adequate to 
preserve his legal challenge on appeal, his claim fails. First, defendant alleges no 
7 
violation of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 "The general rule applicable in 
criminal proceedings . . . is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have 
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1989). Thus, a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea precludes defendant's challenge to the legal adequacy 
of the evidence adduced at the plea hearing. State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 
1977). See also State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 478 (Utah App. 1991) (observing that under 
former rule 11(e)(4), the rule "reflected a determination to limit independent fact finding 
connected with a guilty plea, because a waiver of such fact finding is implicit in the trial 
right waiver effected by such a plea"). 
Second, even to the extent the trial court was required to make an independent 
inquiry into the factual basis for the plea under State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1983), and Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992), defendant fails to demonstrate 
5
 Indeed, at the time defendant entered his plea, on 31 October 1997, rule 11 did 
not require trial courts to ascertain the factual basis for a guilty plea. The 1997 
amendments to rule 11, effective 1 November 1997, the day following defendant's plea, 
added Subdivision (e)(4)(B), which provides as follows: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found . . . there 
is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction. 
8 
that the trial court's inquiry here was inadequate.6 Indeed, prior to rule 11(e)(4)(B), the 
trial court was not bound to any "'rigidity of rule or procedure,9" but could inquire in 
"'any manner consistent with reason and fairness[.]'" Smith, 812 P.2d at 479 (quoting 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977)). The inquiry need go no further than 
necessary to assure, for purposes of due process, that the plea was voluntary and 
intelligent. Smith, 812 P.2d at 478 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 
(1970)). See also Willett, 842 P.2d at 862 ("A court cannot be satisfied that a guilty plea 
is knowing and voluntary unless the record establishes facts that would place the 
defendant at risk of conviction should the matter proceed to trial"). 
The trial court in this case heard the prosecutor's factual summary, and also had 
defendant explain his conduct wherein defendant admitted agreeing to purchase 
marijuana at a set price (R. 71: 13-15), add. B. A similar inquiry was held adequate in 
6The supreme court held the trial courts' inquiries in Breckenridge, and Willett, to 
be inadequate on grounds that are distinguishable here. In Breckenridge, the defendant 
alleged an actual violation of former rule 11(e)(4), because the trial court failed to enter 
any finding that he understood the nature and elements of the offense to which he plead 
guilty. 688 P.2d at 443. On appeal, the supreme court determined that Breckenridge did 
not in fact understand the nature and elements of arson, because the facts adduced did not 
constitute any knowing or intentional crime. Id. In this case, defendant does not assert 
that his plea was entered in violation of former rule 11(e)(4), nor does he dispute that the 
facts adduced constitute a drug crime. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
Willett is distinguishable on the ground that the colloquy there contained no 
recitation of the facts surrounding the crime. 842 P.2d at 861. As set forth in the body of 
this point, the instant colloquy established sufficient record facts to demonstrate that 
defendant faced a substantial risk of conviction if tried. Willett, 842 P.2d at 862. 
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Smith to assure that "there was some evidence of guilt" in support of the plea. 812 P.2d at 
479. Smith further makes clear that even in cases where inquiry into the factual basis for 
a plea is required by rule, "the trial court itself need not be convinced of guilt. Instead, it 
need only determine that there is enough evidence from which a jury could find defendant 
guilty." Id. 
Accordingly, even if rule 11(e)(4)(B) were applicable in this case, the trial court's 
inquiry adduced "enough" evidence of defendant's guilt to support his plea to arranging. 
Id. It is undisputed that defendant asked the undercover officers to obtain $100 worth of 
marijuana for him and that he initially agreed to make the purchase, only to decline when 
the officers later returned with the marijuana. See Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant argues that 
the arranging statute does not encompass his conduct because he was merely trying to 
secure the marijuana for personal use. See Aplt. Br. at 13. However, defendant cites no 
authority demonstrating that his undisputed agreement to purchase marijuana at a set 
price is legally insufficient to constitute arranging under Section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). 
Indeed, pertinent authority is to the contrary. As stated in State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 
117, 120 (Utah 1987), it is the "agreement" which constitutes the actus reus of the offense 
of arranging. Further, "any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of 
drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by the [arranging statute]." State v. Harrison, 
601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979). See also State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App. 
1990) (recognizing that "any act in furtherance of arranging to distribute . . . a . . . 
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controlled substance constitutes a criminal offense pursuant to the statute"). This is true 
even where nothing of value is exchanged. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924 n.5 (noting that 
"offense of arranging the distribution for value of a controlled substance does not require 
the actual distribution^]" rather, "[a]ll that is needed is the arrangement for such 
distribution, coupled with knowledge or intent"); accord State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Based on the above, defendant's agreement to purchase $100 worth of marijuana 
clearly falls within the range of culpable conduct prohibited in Section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii), 
and placed him at a "risk" of conviction if tried. Willett, 842 P.2d at 862. See, e.g., Scott, 
732 P.2d at 120 (recognizing that one who handles the negotiations and price of a 
controlled substance is properly charged with arranging); State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 
(Utah 1987) (holding that offense of "arranging" is committed when one discusses the 
purchase, sets a price and agrees to make the exchange); State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 
1321 (Utah 1986) (affirming arranging conviction where defendant helped 3rd party 
obtain cocaine and also vouched for the quality of the cocaine, but was merely present 
when undercover officer purchased cocaine); Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185-186 (affirming 
arranging conviction where defendant was but "one link in the chain" of events leading to 
the sale and never possessed cocaine at issue, never discussed prices or handled money, 
and was not present at the time of purchase); State v. Gray, 783 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah App. 
1989) (affirming conviction for arranging where defendant was present and represented 
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the quality of the cocaine during negotiations, and also warned participants that they were 
being followed). 
Additionally, defendant's failure on appeal to demonstrate that the facts adduced at 
the plea hearing are legally inadequate to constitute arranging under Section 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii), disposes of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
the factual basis for the plea below, see Aplt. Br. at 18 n.l. See also State v. Strain, 885 
P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing appellant's burden to establish trial 
counsel's performance both "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;" and 
also prejudiced the outcome). Even assuming defendant's claim of a legally insufficient 
factual basis for his plea was meritorious, defendant does not dispute that in agreeing to 
plead guilty to a drug offense, he escaped trial on two other first degree felony offenses. 
See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that "an accused can 
lawfully plead guilty to an offense for which he could not have been convicted if the plea 
is in exchange for a lesser sentence). This strategic benefit is grounds alone for rejecting 
defendant's claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 44 (Utah 1996) 
(counsel does not perform deficiently by opting not to make futile objections or motions); 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982) ("Effective representation does not 
require counsel to object when doing so would be futile."). Defendant's guilty plea to 
arranging is therefore proper and his contrary claim should be rejected. 
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POINT II 
THE STATE AGREES THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE DRUG-FREE ZONE PENALTY 
ENHANCEMENT ELEMENT 
Defendants convicted for drug offenses are subject to enhanced penalties if the 
offense occurs within 1000 feet of specified public places. State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 
146, 147 (Utah App. 1996). The penalty enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(4) (1996 & Supp. 1998), "adds an extra element" to drug offenses "that must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decides the predicate offense." 
Powasnik, 918 P.2d at 147-148. In other words, "the penalty enhancement constitutes a 
distinct crime separate and apart" from the drug offense itself. Id. 
Here, defendant also challenges the "factual basis for enhancing the offense to a 
second degree felony under § 58-37-8(4), because absolutely no facts were presented (sic) 
show defendant's actions occurred in a drug free zone." Aplt. Br. at 19. This issue is also 
raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 
P.2d at 16; Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45. Defendant does not claim that the Court 
should also consider this issue on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See 
Aplt. Br. at 18-19 n.l. 
The State agrees that the record is devoid of any facts indicating that the drug 
offense actually occurred in a drug-free zone for purposes of Section 58-37-8(4)(a). 
Indeed, neither the drug-free zone penalty enhancement element, nor its factual basis is 
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articulated in defendant's plea affidavit (R. 18-11), add. A. Any discussion of the penalty 
enhancement element and its factual basis is similarly absent from the plea hearing (R. 
71), add. B. Therefore, in adherence to the State's duty to promote justice, State v. 
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980), the State urges the Court to vacate defendant's 
second degree felony conviction, enter a judgment of conviction for a third degree felony, 
and remand to the trial court for imposition of sentence. Powasnik, 918 P.2d at 149 
(citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209-11 (Utah 1993)). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but should also vacate the unsupported second degree 
felony penalty enhancement element and enter a judgement of conviction for the third 
degree felony offense of arranging to distribute marijuana. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ November 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ryz^u^jf > \ Ao 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT 
BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY 
Case No. llNDrtSti 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Iry^p^e^J^ JL<sv^ArfJ^m& initials each paragraph 
below and signs this statement for the purpose of demonstrating to the Court that he/she understands 
the following: 
1. I understand that I am charged with the offense(s) of: Count I U J ^ ^ ^ / T / I ^ ^ -hr 




-Felony/Misdemeanor, Cuunl IV." 
»gree Felony /Misdemeanor; and Count V: 
-Degree Felony /Misdemeanor;. I have read the Information with 
my attorney and I understand what it says. 
0018 
2. My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and how the charges contained in the 
Information apply to me. 
3. I understand that if I plead guilty to these charge(s) I can be imprisoned or jailed for a term 
of , years and that I can also receive a fine of up to 
4 . 1 understand that the judge may sentence me to prison (or jail for a misdemeanor) and also 
fine me, or that he can choose between these two possibilities. 
5. I understand that if I am sentenced on more than one charge, the judge may allow my 
prison/jail terms for each charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the other 
(consecutively). 
6. I understand that I have the right to be helped by an attorney throughout my entire case, 
including a trial and an appeal. If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will appoint one to help 
me. 
7. I understand that I have the right to plead "not guilty" and go to trial if I want to do so. 
8. I understand that I have the right to a jury trial, which includes the following: 
A. I have the right to be helped by an attorney; 
B. I have the right to see and listen to the witnesses who testify against me; 
C. My attorney can cross-examine all the witnesses who testify against me; 
D. I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if they do not want to come to my 
trial, I can use subpoenas to make them come and testify on my behalf; 
E. I cannot be forced to take the witness stand and admit my guilt, and I do not 
have to testify at my trial unless I want to do so; 
0017 
mmm^m F. If I decide not to testify, the jury will be instructed that they cannot assume that 
I am guilty just because I did not testify; 
G. I understand that I am presumed to be innocent of the charges against me, and 
that this presumption will end only if each member of the jury is convinced of 
my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 
H. If I go to trial and I am convicted, I have the right to appeal my conviction. If I 
cannot afford my own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of the 
appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me. 
9. I understand that during the trial the State has the burden of proving what are called 
"elements" of the charge against me. In my case the elements are as follows: 
Count I: 
A. That I, W T ^ I ^ ^ 
B. in Utah County, State of Utah; 
C. on or about (U^A ^ f f ? ? ' ; 
3^ 
E. _ 
AMs*J-\4 ^A^^A^o\J H 
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Count II: 
A. That I, 
B. in Utah County, State of Utah; 
C. on or about 
Count III: 
A. That I, 
B. in Utah County,\State of Utah; 
C. on or about 
Count IV: 
A. That I, 
B. in Utah County, State of Utah; 
0015 
C. on or about 
Count V: 
A. That I, 
B. in Utah County, Stat\of Utah; 




10. I understand that if I plead guilty to the charges contained in the Information, such a plea 
means that: 
A. My plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements listed in paragraph 9 
above. 
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_ _ B. I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my right to a presumption of my 
innocence, my right to see and cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my 
right not to testify; 
C. I am agreeing to allow the judge to find me guilty of the charge (charges) 
against me; 
D. I am relieving the State of its job of proving me guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 
E. I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence me for my crime without the 
benefit of a jury trial; 
F. I am giving up my right to appeal the verdict of the Court. 
G. That if I change my mind and wish to seek to withdraw my plea of guilty, I 
must do so in writing within thirty (30) days of today's date and that even then, 
the judge may or may not allow me to withdraw the guilty plea. 
11. I know that when I enter my plea of guilty, the judge may ask me questions under oath 
about the charges in this case. I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the record and in 
the presence of my attorney, and I can be prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge. 
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12. I have entered into the following plea agreement with the State:
 A _x - _ * A 
Approved as to content 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
13. No threats or promises of any sort have been made to force me or to persuade me to 
enter into this plea agreement. 
14. No one has promised me that I would receive a lighter sentence because I am pleading 
guilty instead of going to trial. 
15. My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I may actually receive if I plead guilty, 
but I understand that the Court is not bound by my attorney's words. 
16. I understand that any agreements made between my attorney and the State regarding 
recommendations for sentencing are not binding upon the Court. 
17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after full and careful thought, with the 
advice of my attorney, and with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of my 
case and the possible results of this plea. 
18. I have discussed this case and this plea with my attorney as much as I wish to do so 
and I am satisfied with the advice of my attorney. 
19. My attorney has helped me understand and fill out this form. 
0012 
20. I am not now under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants, and I was 
not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants when my attorney and I went through 
this form. 
21. I am entering a plea of guilty to the charges against me because I am, in fact, guilty of 
the charges. 
22. I know of no reason why I should not plead guilty to the charges contained in the 
Amended Information. 
23. I have the following educational background:^ L^UrtA 
24. I can read, write, and understand the English language. 
25. I am not presently being treated for mental illness that would affect my ability to 
voluntarily and knowingly make this guilty olea. 
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THE COURT: Counsel, it's my understanding 
that your client wishes to waive his right to a 
preliminary hearing and proceed to have the court take a 
plea at this time as a result of a plea bargain; is that 
correct? 
MR. KILLPACK: Judge, I'm not sure whether or 
not it's correct. I would like a chance to discuss that 
just a minute on the record, if we could. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KILLPACK: I have advised Mr. Sinju, 
there is an offer of settlement that would involve the 
Defendant's plea of guilty to Count III in exchange for 
the State's dismissal of Counts I and II. The state has 
also been willing to recommend a 90 day jail time. This 
is a first offense for him, coupled with deportation 
thereafter, immediately thereafter. 
Mr. Sinju is willing to go forward on that 
basis if he could serve a total of 90 days, and of 
course I have explained to him, first, we don't bind the 
court here; the only agreement we can make is with the 
State. And secondly, I have advised the court --or 
excuse me, Mr. Sinju, after consultation with the Court 
and counsel for the State, I am confident that he will 
receive credit for time served; so that the amount of 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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time he would serve total, in all likelihood on this 
case as far as I can predict how the outcome would be, 
would be 90 days. 
The defendant has some reservations on that, 
because he doesn't understand -- or he indicates his 
concern that the court may, at sentencing, impose a 
greater period of time. 
THE COURT: Let me suggest to you that the 
only reason the court would alter your plea agreement, 
from my perspective, would be should the presentence 
investigative report determine that he has a criminal 
record that has not been disclosed to the court, and 
that that would justify the court in imposing a sentence 
beyond that which you have agreed to plea to. 
MR. KILLPACK: You have no other criminal 
record do you? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't. 
MR. KILLPACK: The Judge is indicating it 
would be his position to give you the 90 days and credit 
for time served. 
THE DEFENDANT: 90 days? 
THE COURT: 90 days. 
THE DEFENDANT: I go back to jail, I would be 
two months more, including the one I've been in? 
THE COURT: 90 days total from the time of 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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your arrest. 
THE DEFENDANT: I donft do more than that; is 
that correct? 
THE COURT: Well, if what you're telling me 
is true, that you have no other criminal record. 
THE DEFENDANT: They can look into the 
record. 
THE COURT: They're going to do that. 
MR. KILLPACK: If they do that and confirm 
what you say, that will be the outcome. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay, yeah, go for it. 
THE COURT: Would you like to step forward? 
MR. KILLPACK: Judge, his initials have not 
been affixed to each paragraph, although I have been 
over each one of them with him and he understands each 
of them. Mr. Jube and myself have both affixed our 
signatures there, and I also have a signed affidavit. 
Would you like him to sign each paragraph? 
THE COURT: He needn't. We'll proceed 
without that, and I'll examine him regarding it. 
May we have his right-hand unshackled. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I can? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
THE DEFENDANT: I want to look into this case 
one more time if I'm guilty. I mean this is ridiculous. 
I don't really understand. I am not a attorney, but I 
can't expect somebody can entrap me to do something that 
wasn't right. When I went and think about this, I 
refused and got arrested. It hurts me right here. So 
if we can at least try to judge this case one more time, 
I would like this case to be dismissed instead of me 
serve 90 days. 
THE COURT: If that is your preference, then 
you should not enter into the agreement at this time. 
If you're not willing to enter a plea of guilty to the 
arranging to distribute marijuana charge, why then you 
should not enter into the agreement. 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't buy marijuana, your 
Honor. I refused this. 
MR. JUBE: I'm not sure we're creating a 
record that would stand on appeal anyway. Maybe we 
ought to have a preliminary hearing. 
(Discussions between the 
Defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
MR. KILLPACK: As I explained to you, the 
time for negotiation is now. It's just a matter of 
whether you want to go forward or not. You're not 
charged with selling or distributing. You are charged 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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with arranging. I explained that. If you feel you're 
not guilty of the arranging, then we should proceed. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'll go for it. 
MR. KILLPACK: Do you want to take my 
recommendation then? 
THE DEFENDANT: I will take it. 
MR. KILLPACK: Do you understand the 
difference between actually selling and arranging as we 
discussed here a moment ago? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
MR. KILLPACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: If you'll raise your right-hand, 
the clerk will administer an oath to you. 
ERNEST SINJU 
called as a witness herein, was 
duly sworn, and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in the case now before 
the Court will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Mr. Killpack, you've previously 
received a copy of the information. Do you desire to 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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have it read. 
MR. KILLPACK: No, Judge, we waive that. 
He's been over that in detail. 
THE COURT: And if you'll tell us your true 
and correct name and date of birth. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, my name is Ernest 
Sinju, December 16, 1976. 
THE COURT: And have you had an opportunity 
to read and review the statement by defendant before 
entry of plea with your attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: Say that one more time. 
THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to 
read and review that statement with your attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't go through it --
okay. 
MR. KILLPACK: Are you agreeable to that? 
(Further discussions between the 
defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
MR. KILLPACK: He's expressed his concern 
about immigration picking him up. I explained to him we 
don't bind immigration authorities here, but I'll do 
everything I can to see they take him at the end of that 
time. 
THE COURT: Do you understand those rights 
that are in that statement? 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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THE DEFENDANT: The rights that is in the 
statement? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about 
those rights. 
THE DEFENDANT: I truly -- I do. Just to be 
sure, if I plead guilty, I just do the 90 days? 
THE COURT: That's right. 
THE DEFENDANT: Then I will take it. 
THE COURT: Do you realize that if you desire 
to change your plea from that which you're entering into 
today, that you must initiate action to do so by filing 
a written motion with this court within thirty days of 
today's date; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Say that again. 
THE COURT: If you desire to change your plea 
from that which you're entering today, you must initiate 
action to do so by filing a written motion with this 
court within 3 0 days of today's date? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And you understand that you have 
the right to plead not guilty; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do understand that. 
THE COURT: And by entering a plea of guilty 
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you're giving up that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: That if I plead guilty I'm 
giving up that right to plead not guilty? 
THE COURT: To plead not guilty. If you're 
going to plead guilty you give up your right to plead 
not guilty. Does that make sense to you? 
THE DEFENDANT: That make sense to me. 
THE COURT: Therefore, you do also give up 
the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses and the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses; do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to sign the 
statement at this time and thereby acknowledge that it's 
true and correct and that you understand the rights that 
are stated within that statement, and that you're 
voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally waving those 
rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And do you understand you would 
be giving up the right to appeal which you might 
otherwise have? 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the 
maximum sentence that the law would permit the court to 
sentence you would be not less than 1, nor more than 15 
years in the Utah State Prison? That's what a second 
degree felony would permit me to do. 
THE DEFENDANT: You mean if I plead guilty --
THE COURT: That is a maximum that I could 
do. 
THE DEFENDANT: Is 15 years? 
MR. KILLPACK: That's if you got the maximum. 
That's not what you might get; that's just what's 
possible. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I understand, but 
there's one thing I'm confused. What I'm confused, if I 
plead guilty it means I do thirty days already and be 
sentenced again to same crime? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. KILLPACK: No. As we talked about, 
credit for time served, the time you're waiting will be 
credited towards the amount of time served. The Judge 
doesn't normally do that, but in this case he's 
indicated his intention to do that. 
THE DEFENDANT: For 90 days? 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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MR. KILLPACK: Uh-huh (affirmative), give you 
the credit for the time served. 
THE DEFENDANT: If that is true, I'll take 
it. All I want to do, is not do that 90 days and then 
say since you plead guilty to this we're going to give 
you two years or — 
THE COURT: As I've indicated to you, the 
only way that would happen is if there is a criminal 
record you did not disclose to us. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay, judge. 
THE COURT: Have you set forth all of the 
elements in the statement? 
MR. KILLPACK: I have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
entering a plea of guilty here today, you are relieving 
the State of its obligation to prove each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury's 
satisfaction? 
THE DEFENDANT: Say that again. 
MR. KILLPACK: He's saying by pleading guilty 
you're not going to trial, and therefore you won't have 
the jurors to decide the case. The judge will decide 
the case. You're giving up your right to go to trial. 
THE DEFENDANT: If I plead guilty then the 
judge is going to decide? 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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MR. KILLPACK: If you plead guilty there 
won't be a trial. If you plead not guilty, they'll have 
to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If you 
plead guilty you give up those rights. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: May I have a factual basis for 
the charge? 
MR. JUBE: Your Honor, on October 2nd, or 
thereabouts, 1997, officers from the Major Crimes Task 
Force, had at least a couple meetings with the defendant 
in a vehicle here in Utah County, Utah. During at least 
one of those meetings there was a discussion about the 
purchase of marijuana. The defendant indicated he would 
like to purchase some marijuana from them. They went 
and got some marijuana from one of the undercover 
officers or others in the crime task force, and brought 
that back to the defendant, at which point there was 
discussion about him taking that marijuana or accepting 
that marijuana for some type of payment. 
(Further discussions between the 
Defendant and Mr. Killpack.) 
MR. KILLPACK: Tell us what happened. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I explain what happened? 
THE COURT: Sure, go ahead. 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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THE DEFENDANT: Okay. This guy named Dave, 
he's claiming he know my brother's name. So I went to 
make a phone call. I saw him making a phone call, too. 
So I was having a conversation. He asked me what 
happened. I told him, then I was beat up. I told him 
this friend I know -- and nobody know about this. They 
told me if I report to the police they kill me. So I 
told him I'm scared of this person. And so what I'm 
thinking, I call the police, ask the police: Can I buy 
a gun? The police say, yes, you can buy a gun if you 
have no felony. What I tell them is I planning to 
report these guys to the police, and I have the gun for 
protection. He say no, don't buy any gun --
THE COURT: Tell me about the marijuana. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's how it started for the 
marijuana. He told me that he has somebody coming from 
Vegas who is a professional killer --
MR. KILLPACK: You're getting off the 
subject. 
THE DEFENDANT: They ask me to give them some 
money. I tell them no. I want to buy marijuana. They 
say forget about marijuana, this is important. I say 
forget it. They say I can get it for you. They went 
and bought it, and I say, "oh, you guys take forever." 
I hide my 100 dollar. Just because they say we get it, 
Creed H. Barker, CSR 
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I say, ffno, I can't afford it. I got it from somebody 
else." They look at me like that --
THE COURT: But at any rate, you did indicate 
to them, when they said they could get you some, you 
said go ahead and get it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I said that. 
THE COURT: That's arranging to distribute; 
okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, if it is your intent 
to enter a plea of guilty to the charge, I would ask 
that you sign the statement at this time. 
MR. KILLPACK: Is that how you sign your 
name? You told me you sign by initials. 
Okay, he's done so, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court has 
received the affidavit --or the Statement of Defendant 
Before Entry of Plea, and notes the appropriate blanks 
have been filled in. The plea agreement is set forth 
therein, signed by the Defendant and his attorney. The 
statement has been signed by the Defendant, the 
Defendant's attorney and the county attorney. The Court 
is satisfied that the defendant knows and understands 
the rights contained in the statement, and has 
knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily waived the 
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same. And the Court will so certify by signing at this 
time, as well. 
The court further notes the affidavit of 
counsel attached thereto. The statement will be made a 
part of the file. 
Mr. Sinju, to the charge contained in the 
information, Count III, arranging to distribute 
marijuana, a controlled substance, in a drug free zone, 
a second degree felony, what is your plea; guilty or not 
guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: A plea of guilty is received and 
accepted by the court. 
Do you have a motion as to Counts I and II? 
MR. JUBE: Move to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. KILLPACK: No, judge. 
THE COURT: Counts I and II are ordered 
dismissed. 
The matter will be referred to the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole for Presentence 
Investigative Report. The Defendant is to cooperate 
with them and give them the information they request in 
order to assist them in preparing a report for the 
Court's use in sentencing in this case. 
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Sentencing will be set for the 12th of 
December at the hour of 8:00 o'clock a.m., at which time 
the Defendant is ordered to be present. 
MR. KILLPACK: May the minute entry indicate 
that he will be in custody until that time? 
THE COURT: Yes, it may so indicate. 
(Proceedings concluded.) 
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entrap 6/4 
entry 8/10, 15/18 
ERNEST 7/15, 8/6 




















guilty 3/13, 6/2, 6/12, 7/2, 9/8, 9/23, 9/25, 
10/2, 10/3, 10/4, 10/5, 10/6, 11/7, 11/17, 12/5, 
12/15, 12/20, 12/24, 13/1, 13/2, 13/4, 15/11, 
16/9, 16/10, 16/11, 16/12 
gun 14/10, 14/12, 14/13 
guy 14/1 
guys 14/12, 14/24 
H 
hand 5/21, 7/12 
help 7/22 
hide 14/25 




II 3/14, 16/14, 16/18 
III 3/13, 16/7 






indicated 11/24, 12/7, 13/14 
indicates 4/5 
indicating 4/18 
information 7/25, 16/7, 16/23 
initials 5/13, 15/14 




intentionally 10/20, 15/25 
investigative 4/11, 16/22 
3 
jail 3/15, 4/23 
Judge 3/7, 4/18, 5/13, 6/7, 8/2, 11/22, 12/10, 















marijuana 6/13, 6/15, 13/14, 13/15, 13/16, 
13/19, 13/20, 14/14, 14/16, 14/21, 14/22, 16/8 
matter 6/23,16/20 






90 3/15, 3/19, 4/3, 4/19, 4/21, 4/22, 4/25, 6/9, 
9/8, 11/25, 12/4 
I motion 9/14, 9/19, 16/14 
1 Move 16/15 
Mr. Jube 5/16, 6/17, 13/9, 16/15 
MR. KILLPACK 3/7, 3/11, 4/15, 4/18, 5/9, 
5/13, 6/21, 6/22, 7/4, 7/7, 7/11, 7/24, 8/2, 8/16, 
8/18, 8/19, 11/11, 11/20, 12/1, 12/13, 12/20, 
13/1, 13/22, 13/23, 14/18, 15/13, 16/17 
Mr. Sinju 3/11, 3/18, 3/23, 16/6 
1 N 
name 8/5, 8/6, 14/2, 15/14 
1 named 14/1 
1 negotiation 6/23 
1 notes 15/18, 16/3 
[ o ; 
1 oath 7/13 
1 objection 16/16 
1 obligation 12/16 
1 October 3/1, 13/9 
1 offense 3/16 
I offer 3/12 
officers 13/10, 13/17 
I open 10/12 
1 opportunity 8/8, 8/12 
order 16/24 
1 ordered 16/18 
outcome 4/2, 5/10 
1 P 










plea 3/5, 3/13, 4/9, 4/14, 6/12, 8/10, 9/12, 
9/17, 9/25, 12/15, 15/11, 15/18, 15/19, 16/9, 
16/12 
plead 9/8, 9/23, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4, 10/5, 11/7, 
11/17, 12/5, 12/24, 13/1, 13/2, 13/4 
pleading 12/20 
point 13/18 





preliminary 3/4, 6/19 
preparing 16/24 








prove 12/16, 13/3 
public 10/11 
purchase 13/14,13/15 
[ Q | 
1 question 5/22 
questions 9/5 
[ & | 
raise 7/12 
rate 15/3 
read 8/1, 8/9, 8/13 
reason 4/9 
reasonable 12/17, 13/3 
receive 3/25 
received 7/25, 15/17,16/12 
recommend 3/15 
recommendation 7/5 
record 3/9, 4/12, 4/16, 5/5, 5/7, 6/18, 12/9 
refused 6/6, 6/16 
relieving 12/15 




review 8/9, 8/13 
rights 8/24, 9/1, 9/6, 10/18, 10/21, 13/4, 15/24 
S 




second 11/5, 16/9 
self 10/10 
selling 6/25, 7/8 
sense 10/6, 10/7 
1 sentence 4/13, 11/3, 11/4 
sentenced 11/18 
sentencing 4/6, 16/25, 17/1 
serve 3/19, 4/1, 6/9 
served 3/25, 4/20, 11/21,11/22, 12/2 
set 12/11, 15/19, 17/1 
settlement 3/12 
sign 5/18, 10/16, 15/12, 15/13, 15/14 
signatures 5/17 







State 3/14, 3/22, 3/24, 11/5, 12/16 
State's 3/14 
statement 8/9, 8/13, 8/25, 9/2, 10/17, 10/19, 








Task 13/10, 13/17 
testified 7/17 
testimony 7/20 
thirty 9/14, 11/17 
time 3/5, 3/15, 3/25, 4/1, 4/7, 4/20, 4/25, 6/2, 
6/7, 6711, 6/23, 8/11, 8/23, 10/17, 11/21, 11/22, 
12/2, 15/12, 16/2, 17/2 
trial 10/11, 12/21, 12/23, 13/2 
true 5/5, 8/4, 10/18, 12/3 
truth 7/21, 7/22 












waive 3/3, 8/2 
waived 15/25 
waving 10/20 
willing 3/15, 3/18, 6/12, 10/16 
wishes 3/3 
witness 7/16 
witnesses 10/13, 10/14 
written 9/14,9/19 
Y 




Hon 25 1} on ffl »97 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK (1808) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
245 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
U 





MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 97140135$— 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. 
Defendant, ERNEST SINJU, pursuant to U.C.A. section 77-13-6,1953 as amended, hereby 
moves the court to withdraw his plea of guilty which was entered at his hearing on October 31,1997 
before the Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. After considering the matter further and the 
consequences of his status as an immigrant, Defendant feels that he is not guilty and therefore moves to 
withdraw his plea of guilty. 
Dated this ^ J / i i a y of November, 1997. 
y-r—=-^L 
Steve* B.Killpack 
Attorney for Defendant 
0029 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, postage prepaid to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 
84606. this j? U- day of November, 1997. 
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